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The Europeanisation of Extradition:  
How Many Light Years Away to Mutual Confidence? 
 
THEODORE KONSTADINIDES* 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice has 
led, amongst else, to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it 
with a simplified system of ‘surrender between judicial authorities’. Following the 
September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, and having considered the potential 
impact on the fight against crime and terrorism, the Heads of State and Government 
of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the 
European Commission, and the former High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy jointly called for a new system that would make it easier for 
justice to be administered across the EU through the enforced transfer of persons from 
one Member State to another. The draft legislative resolution on the Commission 
proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)1 
was adopted on 13 June 2002 by the Council, establishing a pan-European warrant for 
search, arrest, detention and surrender to the judicial authority of the issuing country.2 
As a consequence, in 2004 the EAW gradually replaced extradition between Member 
States.3  
Undeniably, the Framework Decision on the EAW4 has added impetus to the EU 
counter-terrorism response, which since and the terrorist bombings in Madrid (March 
2004) and London (July 2005) has expanded incrementally through the adoption of a 
panoply of measures.5 At the time of writing, not only has the EAW been 
implemented by all the Member States but it is operational in most cases. The 
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1
 Commission Proposal: OJ C 332 E, 27.11.2001; COM (2001) 522; Bull. 9-2001. 
2
 The Framework Decision was adopted under Articles 31 (a) and (b), and Article 34(2) (b) TEU. 
3
 Article 34 TEU determines the legal effects of Third Pillar framework decisions. Almost like EC 
Directives, they are binding on the Member States as to the result to be achieved, and they are to be 
implemented through more concrete national measures. According to Article 34 of the Framework 
Decision, Member States should have taken the necessary measures to comply with the provisions of 
the Framework Decision by 31.12.2003. Italy’s implementation was not completed until April 2005. 
See Report of the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States (revised 
version) COM (2006) 8 final. The first report of the Commission was issued in February 2005, COM 
(2005) 63. 
4
 Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between 
Member States, [2002] OJ L190/1 (hereafter called the Framework Decision on the EAW). 
5
 See Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism, 12.03.2007, MEMO/07/98. See also C. 
Eckes’ chapter in this volume. 
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traditional cooperation between Member States has been replaced by an EU-wide 
system of ‘free movement’ of judicial decisions in criminal matters, covering both 
pre-sentence and final decisions, acting within an area of freedom, security and 
justice. This transition, however, has not occurred without hiccups caused by 
constitutional difficulties. It will be noted below that a period of legal uncertainty 
(with reference to the full application of the EAW) arose during 2005 and 2006 due to 
transposition difficulties of the Framework Decision in certain Member States. This 
stemmed from their own constitutional requirements. Although these problems have, 
in the majority of cases been overcome, a handful of Member States still exercise the 
right to limit the Framework Decision’s substantive scope. 
This chapter discusses the modernisation or, dare we say, Europeanisation of the 
extradition procedures by focusing upon the modernisation of the surrender procedure 
by the Framework Decision on the EAW as well as upon its implementation by the 
Member States. The centre of attention is on mutual recognition as an alternative to 
harmonisation.6 To achieve this we must first examine the two major reforms 
introduced by the Framework Decision on the EAW, namely the abolition of the 
‘double criminality’ test for the categories of offences listed in Article 2(2) of the 
Framework Decision and the limited grounds for refusal of execution, especially the 
rule against surrendering nationals. Such a refusal cannot now rest on any human 
rights considerations, despite its constitutional premise in a number of cases. Second, 
this chapter will explore certain problem areas. It will provide a commentary on the 
paradox that, while the Framework Decision dispenses with verification of the double 
criminality test for the categories of listed offences, it leaves the definition of those 
offences (and the penalties applicable in each case) to the issuing Member State. And 
in accordance with Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision the Member State must 
respect fundamental rights as enshrined in Article 6 TEU as well as the principle of 
legality. The present author argues that ‘mutual recognition’ does not necessarily 
imply mutual trust. The chapter concludes by offering an insight into the changes that 
have occurred since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where 
Communitarisation has taken over the Union’s Third Pillar.  
 
1.2 The Modernisation of the Surrender Procedure 
 
1.2.1 Implementation of the Principle of Mutual Recognition 
 
The Framework Decision on the EAW is the first instrument in the area of 
freedom, security and justice to be adopted following the principle of mutual 
recognition. In opposition to any insistence on uniformity through approximation, the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’ constitutes the least contentious method for 
integration. Mutual recognition does not create common substantive rules. It rather 
depends upon the Member States’ tolerance of the diversity characterizing national 
legal systems. It further encourages cooperation between them through mutual trust 
and recognition of each other’s practices. Mutual recognition was first applied by the 
Court in relation to the Community Pillar on product requirements case law as 
collateral to Community harmonization during the construction of the internal 
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market.7 Mutual recognition gradually expanded to cover other Community policy 
areas and became an additional limitation on national competence.8  
In line with the Tampere European Council (1999) and the succeeding Hague 
Programme (2004) for strengthening freedom, security and justice,9 the EU 
Institutions implemented the principle of mutual recognition in the former Third EU 
Pillar, so as to bring about direct execution of final criminal decisions in the whole 
territory of the European Union. Member States were encouraged to show mutual 
trust in their criminal justice systems to such an extent that each one would 
acknowledge and trust the criminal law in force in other Member States, even in cases 
where the outcome would be different to that applied in its own domestic legislation. 
Accordingly, a measure arising from a judgment of a Member State ought to be 
automatically accepted and should produce the same effects in all Member States of 
the Union.  
Furthermore, the principle of mutual recognition appeared perfectly apt to ensure 
that an individual tried in a Member State for a particular criminal offence should not 
be judged a second time for the identical offence, either in the state in which s/he 
offended or in any other Member State of the Union. This is identified in international 
law as the ne bis in idem principle.10 The Framework Decision on the EAW refers 
implicitly to the principle as constituting one of the grounds for optional non-
execution of the EAW. Hence, according Article 4(6), an executing judicial authority 
may refuse to execute the EAW ‘where the person who is the subject of the European 
arrest warrant is being prosecuted in the executing Member State for the same act as 
that on which the European arrest warrant is based’. In Klaus Bourquain, the Court 
considered the conditions governing the applicability of the ne bis in idem principle as 
enshrined in Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement 
(CISA):  
Article 54 of the CISA, applied to a judgment in absentia delivered in 
accordance with the national legislation of a Contracting State or to an 
ordinary judgment, [and] necessarily implies that the Contracting States 
                                                 
7
 Case 120/78, Commission Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) 
[1979] ECR 649. For further discussion see M. P. Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of 
Justice & The European Economic Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997), pp. 33, 131-136. 
8
 See for instance, the Court’s horizontal approach to the recognition of diplomas in relation to the 
freedom of establishment of EU Citizens in Case 340/89, Vlassopoulou [1991] ECR 2461 and its 
codification in Directive 89/48/EEC on the mutual recognition of diplomas (later replaced by Directive 
2005/36). 
9
 The Presidency Conclusions at the Tampere European Council, 15 and16 October 1999. Available 
online at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm; The Presidency Conclusions at the 
Brussels European Council, 4 and 5 November 2004. Available online at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/14292-r1.en04.pdf. 
10
 Translated from Latin as ‘not twice for the same’. It is often referred to as ‘the double jeopardy 
principle’. (See C.J.M. Safferling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 319-323). A sentenced person will not be returned to the issuing State if 
s/he has already been tried for the same offence. See to that effect: Article 4, Protocol 7 ECHR and 
Article 54 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders (2000) OJL 19. See 
further M. Fletcher, ‘Some Developments to the ne bis in idem Principle in the European Union: 
Criminal Proceedings Against Hüseyn Gözütok and Klaus Brügge’, Modern Law Review, 66 (5) 
(2003), 769; J.A.E. Vervaele, ‘The Transnational ne bis in idem Principle in the EU: Mutual 
Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights’, Utrecht Law Review, 1 (2) (2005), 100; M. 
Wasmeier, ‘The Development of ne bis in idem into a transnational fundamental right in EU law: 
Comments on Recent Developments’, European Law Review, 31 (4) (2006), 565.   
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have mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them 
recognises the criminal law in force in the other Contracting States even 
when the outcome would be different if its own national law were 
applied.11 
The application of the ne bis in idem principle, as set out in Article 54 of the 
Schengen Convention, was adopted by the Council in March 2009. The Council 
proposed a framework decision to that effect in order to avoid the adverse 
consequences arising from parallel proceedings in Member States.12 Extradition was 
only mentioned once, namely in connection with the relevant criteria which 
competent authorities need to consider in order to reach consensus. It relates to ‘the 
location of the suspected or accused persons and possibilities for securing their 
surrender or extradition to other jurisdictions’.13   
EU Institutions have not only emphasized the significance of enhanced mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments as a means of facilitating co-operation 
between authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights.14 They have also 
emphasized that the convergence among the different forms of cooperation will 
necessitate the approximation of national legislation. Textually, the trend among 
Member States to establish a simplified and efficient procedure, founded on mutual 
confidence and respect of the integrity of each other’s constitutions and judicial 
systems, was manifested in former Articles 31(a), (b) and 34(2)(b) TEU.15 These 
Treaty provisions set out the first series of targets to bring about judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, the facilitation of extradition, and the adoption of framework 
decisions for the purpose of approximating the laws and regulations of Member 
States.  
                                                 
11
 Case C-297/07 Klaus Bourquain (2008) ECR 00000. The case concerned a soldier in the French 
Foreign Legion who in 1960 was sentenced to death in absentia after found guilty of desertion and 
murder. In 2002, the Regensburg Public Prosecutor’s Office in Germany, where Bourquain had taken 
refuge, charged him with murder in respect of the same acts. The Regional Court decided to stay the 
proceedings and to make a preliminary reference to the Court as to whether a person whose trial has 
been finally disposed of in one Contracting Party may be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for 
the same act when, under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party, the sentence imposed on him 
could never have been enforced. See also Case C-288/05, Jürgen Kretzinger; Case C-491/07, Vladimir 
Turanský (2008) ECR 00000. 
12
 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Prevention and Settlement of Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction in Criminal Proceedings, 27.03.2009, 8013/09 COPEN 62,  
13
 According to the proposal (para 10): ‘If consensus cannot be reached, the Member States should 
retain their right to initiate or continue criminal proceedings for any criminal offence which falls within 
their national jurisdiction. Where consensus has been reached on the concentration of criminal 
proceedings in one Member State, the competent authorities in the other Member State should act in a 
way that is compatible with that consensus.’   
14
 ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Mutual 
recognition of Final Decisions in criminal matters’ COM (2000) 0495; ‘Green Paper on the 
approximation, mutual recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the European Union’ 
COM (2004) 334; ‘White Paper on exchanges of information on convictions and the effect of such 
convictions in the European Union’ COM (2005) 10; ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the EP on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters and the 
strengthening of mutual trust between Member States’ COM (2005) 195; Council Framework Decision 
2005/214/JHA; Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA. 
15
 In the Treaty of Lisbon, Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters consists of Chapter 4, Articles 82 -
85 TFEU. Article 82 TFEU sets the tone: ‘Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall 
be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include 
the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States…’ 
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As mentioned at the beginning, the Framework Decision on the EAW16 constitutes 
the first concrete measure in the field of European criminal law implementing the 
principle of mutual recognition. It has replaced all multilateral extradition agreements 
based on public international law and EU or Schengen extradition arrangements. 
Already in Article 1(2), the Framework Decision points to the principle of mutual 
recognition as the preliminary way of executing any EAW. To put it in the 
Commission’s phrasing, ‘the arrest warrant is the first and most symbolic measure 
applying the principle of mutual recognition’.17 Given the breadth of the areas that it 
captures and the momentous time at which it was introduced, it has been characterized 
as the ‘star rule on judicial cooperation in criminal matters’18 and as ‘an important 
procedural instrument in the fight against terrorism’.19 In its 2007 Report on the 
implementation (since 2005) of the Framework Decision, the Commission states that 
‘the arrest warrant is a success’.20 The Commission not only mentions the fact that the 
total number of requests exchanged between Member States has risen substantially 
but it also notes that the EAW surrenders have been effected within shorter time limits 
than in the previous two years.  
 
1.2.2 Abolition of the Double Criminality Test 
 
Contextually, the EAW covers almost every offence punishable in the Member 
States by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 
three years and as they are defined by the law of the issuing state.21 It does not in 
itself, provide for any punishments. It is rather aimed at simplifying the extradition 
procedures for suspected criminals within the territory of the European Union by 
creating a list of substantive criminal offences, grouped into designated areas. 
According to Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision, the EAW is a judicial decision. 
The exclusion of the executive power from the process was justified by the objective 
of breaking free from the political considerations that cause delay in the extradition 
procedure. When, therefore, a crime is included within a designated ‘criminal area’ 
(e.g. illegal human trafficking,22 money laundering,23 drug importation24, terrorism25), 
the issuing Member State’s judicial authorities may contact their counterparts in the 
executing Member State directly to achieve the surrender of a person within ten or 
                                                 
16
 Council Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures 
Between Member States (13 June 2002) (2002/584/JHA).  See also R. Blextoon (ed.), Handbook on the 
European Arrest Warrant (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
17
 Report of the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on the “European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States”, COM (2005) 
63, p.2. 
18
 M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘European Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’, European Law Journal, 9 
(2003), 614.  
19
 M. Jimeno-Bulnes, ‘After September 11th: The Fight Against Terrorism in National and European 
Law. Substantive and Procedural Rules: Some Examples’, European Law Journal, 10 (2004), 235.  
20
 ‘Report from the Commission on the Implementation since 2005 of the Council Decision of 13 June 
2002 on the European Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States’, 
(11.08.2007) COM (2007) 407 final. 
21
 See Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision for the list of offences, which rise to surrender pursuant 
to a EAW.  
22
 King’s Prosecutor (Brussels) v. Armas [2006] 1 All E.R. 647. 
23
 Hunt v. Belgium [2006] EWHC 165. 
24
 Hall v. Germany [2006] EWHC 462; Parasiliti – Mollica v. Deputy Public Prosecutor (Messina) 
[2005] EWHC 3262. 
25
 Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court), decision of 18 July 2005 (2 BvR 2236/04) 
on the German European Arrest Warrant Law. 
PROOF VERSION 
 6 
sixty days (depending on whether the arrested person consents to being surrendered) 
in order to serve there the custodial sentence or detention order passed against 
him/her. Member States cannot refuse to surrender to another Member State any of 
their own citizens on the grounds that they are nationals.26 This implies that if a 
Member State issues a EAW against a national of another Member State, then the 
latter must surrender its national to the former without consideration of the ‘double 
criminality rule’. 
Contrary to most extradition treaties, the Framework Decision on the EAW has 
removed previous extradition safeguards. It has abolished both the traditional ‘double 
criminality rule’ of the thirty-two offences listed in Article 2 (2) and – where the 
arrested person consents – the ‘specialty rule’.27 The former, (double criminality rule) 
constitutes a requirement that the offence in question constitutes an offence both 
under the law of the state where the alleged offence occurred and of the requesting 
state seeking extradition. The latter rule (specialty rule), is a customary international 
law practice, which requires states to undertake to prosecute the alleged conduct of 
the suspect whose extradition is sought only in respect to extraditable offences set out 
in the extradition request.28  
Under the system introduced by the Framework Decision, the double criminality 
rule has been reserved only for offences other than those designated in Article 2 of the 
Framework Decision.29 Although the EAW applies without the need to fulfil the 
condition of the double criminalisation of an act, in some Member States the old test 
of double criminality may coincide with the operation of the EAW. For instance, 
under section 64(3) (b) of the UK’s Extradition Act 200330 a person’s conduct:  
…also constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 1 
territory (i.e. all EU countries operating the European Arrest Warrant 
System) if … the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of 
the relevant part of the United Kingdom if it occurred in that part of the 
United Kingdom.  
In Hosseini v. France31 the two Member States concerned (France and the UK) 
agreed that the conduct of illegal human trafficking constituted an offence in France 
and would have constituted an offence had it occurred in England. Therefore the 
conduct alleged in the warrant amounted to extraditable offence pursuant to s. 64(3) 
of the Extradition Act 2003. In England, the High Court took into account the EAW 
and concluded:  
…the relevant question, therefore, is whether his [Hosseini’s] 
extradition pursuant to the 2003 Act would be in accordance with the 
law; and, as I have already indicated, it plainly would be. The starting 
                                                 
26
 See Articles 3; 4; 5; 6; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 17; 26; 27 of the Framework Decision as regards details on 
operation and procedures of the European Arrest Warrant. 
27
 Article 13(1). 
28
 See Case C-388/08 PPU, Criminal Proceedings against Leymann and Pustovarov [2008] ECR 
00000. The case involved a change to the description of the facts in the course of the proceedings (the 
class of narcotic drugs). The Court stressed that the alteration of the description of the illegal 
trafficking offence from hashish to amphetamines was not capable of being characterized as another 
offence and therefore triggering the specialty rule.  
29
 Article 2(4) provides: ‘For offences other than those covered by paragraph 2, surrender may be 
subject to the condition that the acts for which the European arrest warrant has been issued constitute 
an offence under the law of the executing Member State, whatever the constituent elements or however 
it is described.’  
30
 The Extradition Act (2003) entered into force on January 1 2004. 
31
 Hosseini v. France [2006] EWHC 1333. 
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point under the 2003 Act is the issue of a European arrest warrant by a 
judicial authority in another member state. Consistently with the 
Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 which it implements, the 
2003 Act recognises and gives effect to the issue of the warrant.32 
The double criminality rule has long been considered by Member States as the core 
feature of extradition law. Its abolition has created practical problems that render the 
application of the EAW open to discussion.33 One example is when the warrant does 
not provide particulars of the provision of national law that renders the conduct of the 
arrested person an offence under that law.34 In Hunt v. Belgium35, for instance, the 
Administrative Court of England and Wales ruled that the warrant should contain a 
statement that ‘the person, in respect of whom the warrant was issued, was accused in 
the category 1 territory of the commission of an offence specified in the warrant.’ In 
this case the warrant failed to conform to the requirements of the British Extradition 
Act 2003 as it did not identify the provision of Belgian legislation under which the 
suspect’s conduct was alleged to constitute an offence. Thus the warrant had to be 
quashed. In Armas,36 on the other hand, the warrant was clear as the nature and 
classification of the offence in question. This offence was identified as ‘systematic 
illegal immigration’ (a listed offence). Nonetheless, the warrant had to be quashed 
because some of the offences of the person sentenced (in absentia) had occurred in 
the UK. Thus the offender could not be surrendered to Belgium under section 65(2)(a) 
of the British Extradition Act 2003, which states that ‘the conduct constitutes an 
extradition offence in relation to the category 1 territory if… the conduct occurs in the 
category 1 territory and no part of it occurs in the United Kingdom.’ 37  
The use of the double criminality test is still widespread, especially in cases 
involving errors in the EAW procedure. The consequence of accuracy and attention to 
detail in the preparation of a EAW was recently stressed by the Judicial Committee of 
the House of Lords in Hilali38. In 2004, a EAW was issued by Spain seeking the 
surrender of Mr Farid Hilali for the purpose of his prosecution for the offence of 
participation in a terrorist organization and involvement in a terrorist conspiracy to 
commit the 9/11 terrorist attacks. An extradition order was made by Senior District 
Judge Workman in 2005 in the Magistrates’ Court under Section 21(3) of the (British) 
Extradition Act 2003 ordering Mr Hilali’s extradition to Spain. The information in the 
EAW referred to a link between the claimant and Mr Barakat Yarkas. Mr Yarkas who 
was portrayed as a key figure in the terrorist conspiracy was, some time after the 
EAW was issued against Mr Hilali, acquitted by the Supreme Court in Spain because 
of inadmissible evidence. While remanded in custody, Mr Hilali claimed that, 
notwithstanding the lawfulness of the original extradition order, this change of 
                                                 
32
 Per Lord Justice Richards in Hosseini v. France [2006] EWHC 1333. para 47. 
33
 E.V. Sliedregt, ‘The Principle of Dual Criminality and the European Arrest Warrant’ in N. Keijzer 
and E.V. Sliedregt (eds.), European Arrest Warrant in Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1310194 (last browsed on 31 January 2009). 
34
 Hall v. Germany [2006] EWHC 462. 
35
 Hunt v. Belgium [2006] EWHC 165 
36
 [2006] 1 All E.R. 647. The question in this case was whether a request by Belgium for the extradition 
of a fugitive offender could be successfully brought under section 65 of the British Extradition Act 
(2003) when part of the appellant’s conduct specified in the European Arrest Warrant took place in the 
UK. 
37
 Other cases concerning problems arising from the information contained within the warrant include 
Peter Von Der Pahlen v. Austria [2006] EWHC 1672; Gersine Nazaret Raoul Fitzpatrick v. Office of 
the Public Prosecutor of the County Court of Montlucon, France [2006] EWHC 760; Dabas v. Spain 
[2007] 2 AC 31. 
38
 Hilali v. Governor of Whitemoor Prison (Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus) [2008] UKHL 3. 
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circumstances was fundamental and undermined the basis on which his extradition 
order had been made and was in breach of the specialty rule. He therefore sought a 
writ of habeas corpus, as the appropriate remedy against his continued detention 
which, although allowed by the High Court,39 was later rejected by the House of 
Lords. Lord Hope stressed that an inquiry into the evidential basis on which the EAW 
is sought runs counter to the principle of mutual recognition and is impermissible. 
Hence, while the decision of whether the alleged crime specified in the EAW 
constitutes an extradition offence is reserved by the courts of the executing state, the 
evidence on which it was based and its admissibility are entirely matters for the court 
of the issuing state.40  
The mischief and confusion that arose in this case were related, first, to the fact 
that the Spanish authorities did not complete the EAW correctly, setting out only a 
brief description of the offence and giving no more than the particulars required by 
Article 8 of the Framework Decision on the EAW. By contrast, the information in the 
EAW concerning the relevant evidence was ‘long, extraneous and potentially 
confusing’41 and was developed ‘at inordinate length’, including ‘much irrelevant 
material’.42 Second, in making the order of extradition of Mr Hilali, the District Judge 
at the Magistrates Court did not apply his mind to the question whether that 
participation in a terrorist organisation was not a listed offence but decided the case 
on the grounds that the alleged conduct amounted to an ‘extradition offence’ under 
the British Extradition Act 2003. The application of the double criminality test was 
more convenient to the District Judge who set out to make the extradition order once 
he was satisfied that had the offence occurred in England, it would have been 
classified as a conspiracy to commit the offence of murder of persons in America. It is 
further noteworthy that, according to Lord Hope, the district judge had never been 
asked to comment on whether participation in a terrorist organisation constitutes an 
extradition offence43, not even, if he were to be satisfied that murder (a listed offence) 
includes, by implication, conspiracy to murder. Third, one cannot overlook the 
legislative obtuseness characterizing the implementation of the EAW in the UK, 
effectively criticized by Spencer in 2008.44 
Mr Hilali’s appeal raised delicate hypothetical questions regarding the degree of 
cooperative relationships that can be sustained between Member States in post-
extradition matters: in particular, whether, following the extradition of a person, an 
executing state has jurisdiction to order the authorities of a requesting state either to 
detain him only in relation to the offences for which he was extradited or alternatively 
to demand his return on the grounds that he is being (or is likely to be) deprived of the 
specialty rule. While British courts act under statute and do not possess the 
competence to intervene and give directions to a court of another sovereign state, they 
can, under Section 54 of the Extradition Act 2003, request the judicial authorities of 
an issuing state to make a request for an extradited person to be dealt with for an 
offence for which he was not surrendered. Furthermore, an alleged breach of the 
                                                 
39
 Hilali v. Governor of Whitemoor Prison [2007] EWHC 939, paras 40, 80, 81. 
40
 See more recently Kucera v. Czech Republic [2008] EWHC 414.  
41
 Hilali v. Governor of Whitemoor Prison [2007] EWHC 939, para 80. 
42
 Hilali v. Governor of Whitemoor Prison (Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus) [2008] UKHL 3, 
para 26. 
43
 Ibid., para 27. 
44
 J.R. Spencer, ‘The Drafting of Criminal Legislation: Need it be so Impenetrable?’, Cambridge Law 
Journal, 67(3) (2008), 593. See also L.W. Blake, T. Sinnamon and J. Pointing, ‘Over-regulation and 
Suing the State for Negligent Legislation’, Statute Law Review, (2007), 1. 
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specialty rule should only be resolved by way of appeal to any higher court of the 
issuing state and, if necessary, to the European Court of Justice.  
These considerations, however, were not relevant to Mr Hilali’s case. Thus, the 
House of Lords dismissed his application for judicial review and affirmed the 
Magistrates’ Court order of 2005 for the claimant’s extradition to Spain but on 
different grounds to the ones stated in the EAW. Since participation in a terrorist 
organization is not a listed offence as per Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision on 
the EAW, the House of Lords held that the information in the EAW on the alleged 
offence had sufficiently particularized the type of conduct that is contemplated by the 
new surrender procedure. Hence, the double criminality test was applied in 
accordance with Article 64(3) of the British Extradition Act 2003. The offences of 
conspiracy to commit the offence of murder of persons in the United States and of 
destroying, damaging or endangering the safety of aircraft, contrary to section 2 of the 
Aviation Security Act 1982, were the only offences in respect of which Mr Hilali 
could be extradited. 
It is apparent that mutual recognition has not overridden the rule of double 
criminality. Even in relation to listed offences, the principle of double criminality has 
not been entirely abandoned by all Member States. At the time of writing, Slovenia 
and Italy still have it in place against requests based on acts which do not constitute 
criminal offences, therefore attributing more weight to the wishes of the executing 
state than the issuing state. What is more, Germany, Belgium, the UK, and Estonia 
have adopted a restrictive approach in relation to offences committed partly in their 
national territory. In any case, Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision, lists thirty-two 
offences as to which the double criminality test no longer applies, but without, 
however, defining their content, or doing so only in a vague fashion. Additionally, the 
suppression of the double criminality requirement, has failed to eliminate mistrust 
between Member States, especially with reference to detention facilities, effectiveness 
of their legal systems, and procedural guarantees.45  
 
1.2.3 Extradition of Own Nationals in Europe 
 
 The most controversial measure under the system introduced by the EAW is that 
created by the obligation of a Member State to extradite its own nationals at the 
request of another Member State, even for offences that are not punishable in the 
former.46 The non-surrender of own nationals ‘has its origins in the sovereign 
authority of the ruler to control his subjects, the bond of allegiance between them, and 
the lack of trust in other legal systems’.47 Moreover, it constitutes an exceptionally 
delicate issue in extradition law,48 employed sometimes by governments as a political 
                                                 
45
 See Council of the European Union, ‘Replies to Questionnaire on Quantitative Information on the 
Practical Operation of the European Arrest Warrant – Year 2008’ 9734/1/09 REV 1. 
46
 See Opinion of the High Court of Justice delivered by Lord Justice Clerk in Antonio La Torre v. Her 
Majesty’s Advocate [2006] HCJAC 56: ‘While under other UK legislation membership of certain 
terrorist organisations might be an offence per se, as in the case of certain Irish organisations for 
example, membership of an Italian organisation was not an offence known to the law of Scotland.’  
47
 Z. Deen-Racsmány and R. Blekxtoon, ‘The Decline of the Nationality Exception in European 
Extradition? The Impact of the Regulation of (Non-) Surrender of Nationals and Dual Criminality 
under the European Arrest Warrant’, European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 
13 (2005), 317. 
48
 Although Member States such as the UK, Spain and the Netherlands have been surrendering 
nationals for a long time, for most member states surrender of nationals to stand trial in another 
Member State constitutes a novelty. See para 36 of the Austrian Criminal Code (1852) and para 9 of 
the German Criminal Code. 
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technique to revive patriotism.49 Against this, Articles 3 and 4 of the EAW do not 
recognise the long-standing absolute sovereign right to refuse extradition of a 
Member State’s own subjects. Instead, the Framework Decision only refers to the 
‘requested person’ without distinguishing his/her nationality. It encompasses the 
principle that since EU citizens enjoy the benefits of free movement across the Union, 
they are equally responsible for their acts before the national courts of all Member 
States.  
Article 6 of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition identified with the 
concerns of the Member States and allowed room for national authorities to refuse 
extradition on the grounds that the suspected person was a national of the requested 
state. This bar to extradition was ended in 1996 when Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Extradition provided that: 
1. Extradition may not be refused on the ground that the person claimed 
is a national of the requested Member State within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Extradition. 
2. When giving the notification referred to in Article 18 (2), any 
Member State may declare that it will not grant extradition of its 
nationals or will authorize it only under certain specified conditions. 
Although Article 4(6) of the Framework Decision leaves room for non-execution 
in the case of a custodial sentence or a detention order, in principle, there is no 
exception for the surrender of a state’s own nationals, but only an exception which 
can be made in domestic law ‘where the requested person is staying in, or is a national 
or a resident of the executing Member State and that State undertakes to execute the 
sentence or detention order in accordance with its domestic law.’50 Thus, under the 
Framework Decision and national implementing Acts there is some scope for Member 
States to safeguard their own nationals from prosecution in another Member State. 
Still, the Framework Decision makes a stand against the refusal of a Member State to 
extradite its own citizens and prevents a national court from protesting against a crime 
that is not punishable under its own legal system. This inability contravenes the 
guarantees safeguarded by the constitutions of many Member States. For instance, the 
Austrian Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Act (1980) prohibits the extradition 
of its own nationals.51 The same prohibition also appears in Article 55 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland (1997); Article 16 (2) of the German 
Constitution (1949)52 and Article 11 of the Cypriot Constitution (1960).53 As a result 
of the new obligation to surrender own nationals the EAW has come under attack by 
certain national courts arguing that the Framework Decision was drafted without 
                                                 
49
 See M. Plachta, ‘Recent Developments in the Extradition Law’, 2 Yearbook of Polish European 
Studies, 93 (1998), 109. 
50
 Note that the Framework Decision does not define the terms of ‘staying’ and ‘residence’ in the 
executing Member State. This is a relevant criterion insofar as the exception – ground for optional non-
execution of the EAW under Article 4(6) is concerned. See Case C-66/08, Szymon Kozlowski [2008] 
ECR 00000; Case C-123/08 Wolzenburg, Advocate General’s Opinion, 24 March 2009. Advocate 
General Bot stressed that the duration of an individual’s stay in the executing Member State must be 
sufficient in order to establish a link with the executing Member State in order to make the serving of a 
prison sentence there necessary for the person’s rehabilitation. See the Law Societies, Joint Brussels 
Office Update Series, Developments from the ECJ, March 2009. Available at www.lawsociety.org.uk. 
51
 Art. 12 ARHG (Auslieferungs - und Rechtshilfegesetz), Federal Law Gazette No 529/1979. 
52
 Basic law for the Federal Republic of Germany written on May 23 1949 and amended by the 
Unification Treaty of August 31 1990. 
53
 Available at www.kypros.org/Constitution/English/ 
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contemplation of national criminal codes or constitutional provisions and therefore its 
application is impracticable.  
The first national reaction to the new extradition procedures came from Poland on 
27 April 2005. Despite the fact that the judicial authorities in Poland had issued 150 
warrants (in the period May 2004 – November 2004) of which thirty were executed, 
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunal' Konstytucyjny) decided that surrender of 
Polish nationals was incompatible with the Polish Constitution.54 The Constitutional 
Tribunal examined a question of law referred by the Gdańsk Regional Court regarding 
the constitutionality of Article 607t (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (1997) and its 
compatibility with Article 55 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. Article 
607t (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code permits the surrender of a Polish citizen to 
the authorities of another Member State of the European Union in response to the 
EAW.55 By contrast, Article 55 (1) of the Polish Constitution makes it clear that ‘the 
extradition of a Polish citizen shall be forbidden’56.  
The Polish Tribunal emphasized that it retains the competence to examine the 
conformity of normative acts of the Constitution as well as legal provisions 
implementing EU legislation. It highlighted the fact that the Polish Constitution 
bestows certain rights and obligations on Polish citizens. National citizenship, 
according to the Polish Tribunal, is essential for assessing the legal status of an 
individual and EU Citizenship can only ‘complement’ it and not ‘replace’ it (Article 
20 TFEU). In the same manner, EU Citizenship was held not to diminish national 
constitutional guarantees linked to the individual’s fundamental rights. However, the 
Polish tribunal recognized its obligation under Article 9 of the Polish Constitution to 
implement secondary EU legislation and the provisions of the Accession Treaty. It 
also acknowledged its obligation to interpret national legislation in conformity with 
EU law, albeit within certain limits (i.e. to safeguard the rights of Polish citizens with 
respect to their criminal liability). Thus, as a gesture of recognition of EU law 
supremacy, the Polish Tribunal proposed an amendment of the Polish Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Article 55) for the purpose of avoiding a potential breach of its 
obligations under the Treaty. Such an amendment would come from the legislature 
and would define the application of the EAW towards Polish citizens. Likewise, 
Cyprus embarked on a constitution revision (Article 11) so as to authorize the 
extradition of Cypriot nationals for acts committed after its 2004 EU accession.57 
Almost three months later (18 July 2005), on similar grounds, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; BVerfG hereafter) not only 
addressed the issue of extradition of its own nationals but also called into question the 
very foundation of a politically united Europe.58 The ruling of the BVerfG did not 
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 Summary of judgment available here:  
www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/summaries_assets/documents/P_1_05_GB.pdf 
(browsed: 17.10.06).  
55
 It was inserted into the Criminal Procedure Code by an amendment (Amendment Act, March 16, 
2004) that transposed the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant into the Polish legal 
system. 
56
 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 as Published in Dziennik Ustaw No.78, 
item 483. Available at www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/konse.htm 
57
 Supreme Court of Cyprus, Decision of 7.11.2005, Ap. No 294/2005 
58
 Re Constitutionality of German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a European Arrest 
Warrant (2 BVR 2236/04), 18 Jul. 2005: [2006] 1 CMLR 16, BVerfGE 113, 273 ff. The case 
concerned an application by a German national, Mr Mamoun Darkazanli, whose extradition was sought 
by the Spanish authorities on alleged Al-Qaida terrorist charges. See H. Satzger, ‘The German Court 
and the European Arrest Warrant: “Cryptic Signals” from Karlsruhe’, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, 4 (4) (2006), 686; T. Konstadinides, ‘The Perils of the Europeanisation of Extradition 
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declare the EAW unconstitutional. Instead, similarly to the Polish Tribunal, it 
declared the German national implementation law (EAW Act) to be void.59 The 
BVerfG held that the Framework Decision allows a Member State’s judicial 
authorities to refuse to execute the EAW for offences committed in its territory. 
Hence, the effect of its ruling was perceived as a short-term blow to European anti-
terrorism initiatives and a setback to loyal cooperation in the area of police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This is because the EAW did not apply in 
Germany until a new national implementation law was introduced in the form of an 
Act implementing Article 16 (2) GG. According to the BVerfG, the prohibition of 
extradition of German nationals laid down in Article 16 (2) GG does not simply 
embody the duty of a country to safeguard the rights of its nationals but also implies a 
right, based on the reliability of a legal system which nationals put their faith. This 
effectively meant that, until a new national implementation law was introduced (in the 
form of an Act implementing Article 16(2) GG), Germany was allowed – with the 
endorsement of the BVerfG – to infringe Community law, despite the principle of 
loyal cooperation.  
The BVerfG’s ruling, that the EAW Act violated the German Constitution, had a 
boomerang effect upon German requests for the surrender of non-nationals. Since 
Germany no longer applied the principle of mutual trust, the national courts of other 
Member States stressed that, in the absence of a national implementation law on the 
Framework Decision, there was no legal basis on which the German authorities could 
rely to apply for extradition under the EAW procedure.60 Consequently, an amended 
bill was introduced in the German Bundestag on 24 November 2005, taking into 
account the objections spelled out by the BVerfG and therefore establishing that each 
case will be carefully examined to determine whether or not extradition is 
commensurate. The new transposition law entered into force on 2 August 2006. It 
reserves, contrary to the Framework Decision, the double criminality test in mixed 
cases (Auslandsbezug), where the principal part of the offence took place in Germany 
but the result occurred in a another country. 
Of course, this is not to say that all Member States have responded in this German 
manner to the effective transposition of the Framework Decision. There are cases 
where actions for constitutional impropriety have been dismissed by domestic 
courts.61 On 3 May 2006 for instance, the Czech Constitutional Court (Ustavni Soud) 
dismissed an action contesting the EAW implementation legislation, which, according 
to certain senators and MPs, was unconstitutional on the ground that it abolished the 
double criminality rule and authorised the extradition of Czech nationals.62 The 
successful argument was that the surrender of nationals forms part of the wider 
package of obligations contained in the notion of EU Citizenship. Therefore, Czech 
citizens had to assume both the obligations and rights that went with their status as 
EU citizens. 
                                                                                                                                            
Procedures in the EU: Mutuality, Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Guarantees’, Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law, 14 (2007), 179.  
59
 The grounds for review were the following: the German citizenship of the wanted person, the 
protection of the principle of legality and the protection of the principle of recourse to the courts 
against the grant of extradition [Article 2 (1) and Articles 20 (3), 16(2), and 19 (4) GG (Grundgesetz)]. 
60
 Case 2483/2005, Tsokas and Another [2006] CMLR 61 Ar Pag (GR). 
61
 See the reasoning of the Areios Pagos (Hellenic Supreme Court of Cassation) in Case No.591/2005, 
judgment of 08.03.2005. 
62
 See ‘Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’, The Law Societies Joint Brussels Office, Brussels 
Office Law Reform Update Series (September 2006), p.6. 
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The Commission’s 2005 Report on the EAW revealed that only half of all Member 
States had implemented the Framework Decision.63 By 2007, however, not only all 
Member States had implemented it but the Commission reported that legal conflicts 
‘have been overcome’ and ‘are no longer an obstacle’ to the application of the EAW.64 
Yet, the abovementioned reviews of the constitutionality of national law 
implementing the Framework Decision on the EAW stand as reminders to EU 
Institutions that adverse constitutional responses to the implementation of EU law do 
not necessarily arise in cases of potential human rights violations but also when 
fundamental legal principles, inherent deeply in national constitutions, are 
endangered.65 The case of Germany, in particular, reveals the uncertain status of 
former Third Pillar instruments within national legal orders both in relation to their 
hierarchy and judicial obligations they entail. Whilst in none of the abovementioned 
cases did the constitutional courts find it necessary to refer a case to the European 
Court of Justice, the Court was subsequently asked by the Belgian court to rule on the 
legality of the Framework Decision in Advocaten voor de Wereld.66 There, the system 
of preliminary reference provided the Court with an opportunity to contribute its part 
to the resolution of yet another constitutional clash. According to the Court in 
Advocaten voor de Wereld, the validity of the Framework Decision stems from the 
fact that the definition of the listed offences constitutes a matter reserved to the 
Member States. It follows that this does not cause any embarrassing procedural 
implications in its application, because all Member States must respect fundamental 
rights.  
This bold rhetoric, which gives priority to the Framework Decision’s validity over 
questions of legal certainty, has been harshly criticized, especially in view of the fact 
that it puts faith in (or creates burden for) in national authorities to respect 
fundamental rights. Yet it does not foresee any conflict resolution device in case of 
misapplication.67 Others, however, cannot see how the Court could have created such 
mechanism, given that the preliminary reference in Advocaten voor de Wereld was on 
an entirely different matter.68 Whatever the case, the Court won a battle by declaring 
that the first legal instrument incorporating the principle of mutual recognition is 
compatible with fundamental rights. Certainly, the Court paved the way for future 
developments. Yet, a certain inconsistency has been introduced, partly due to the EU 
Institutions hesitation in addressing human rights issues that were not raised in the 
Framework Decision and by the national courts’ disinclination to question the 
protection of fundamental rights in EU law beyond a critique related to the 
constitutional safeguards against extradition available to their own nationals. Both the 
definition of the list of offences and the issue of respect for fundamental rights are 
hereafter described as problem areas.  These foreshadow ongoing conflicts between 
                                                 
63
 Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 
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national constitutional laws and the movement towards enhanced cooperation in 
criminal matters within the Union. 
 
1.3 Current Problem Areas 
 
1.3.1 The Absence of Definitions in the List of Offences 
 
The abolition of double criminality was not followed by any kind of European 
inventory listing disparities in criminal legislation between Member States as to what 
conduct is punishable. Certain offences such as murder and grievous bodily injury, are 
obviously understood as offences in any of the twenty-seven Member States. 
However, many of the thirty-two listed offences do not correspond to defined 
offences under national law. The lack of definition of the offences in respect of which 
the safeguard of dual criminality has been abandoned challenges the principle that 
criminal law must be precise, clear, and predictable, therefore providing one with the 
knowledge of whether an act constitutes an offence. This is crucial, given that various 
forms of undesirable conduct as listed in Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision do 
not constitute a criminal offence under the laws of some Member States. For instance, 
most Member States have not criminalized all circumstances in which corruption may 
occur in the private sector.69 It further creates problems that neither Article 2 (2) nor 
other provisions of the Framework Decision contain definitions of the listed offences.  
According to the European Court of Justice, the answer to the question of whether 
the EAW can be utilized in a case at hand depends on the definitions supplied by the 
criminal law of the issuing Member State regarding the offences in question. This is 
rather challenging to Member States, especially where the offence in question (e.g. 
computer crime) does not satisfy the requirements typically applicable to offences 
under national criminal law. The differences between Member States’ criminal legal 
systems in assessing the severity of a crime (drug trafficking,70 euthanasia / assisted 
suicide,71 abortion72 or spying / plane-spotting inside a military zone,73 to name but a 
few) are obvious. For instance, Belgium has excluded (in its implementation law) the 
possibility of issuing a EAW in respect of a request pertaining to euthanasia or 
abortion.74  
In Advocaten voor de Wereld,75 the Court supported the view that because 
harmonization of national criminal law is not a precondition for the application of the 
EAW, the absence of definitions does not imply an inconsistency with the principles 
of equality and legality in criminal proceedings. Indisputably, the Court’s minimalist 
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approach in Advocaten voor de Wereld saved the Framework Decision from national 
challenges on the ground of lack of competence. By contrast in Kozlowski, the Court 
did not leave it to the Member States to define the terms ‘staying’ and ‘residence’ in 
order to determine the scope of Article 4 (6) of the Framework Decision (optional 
non-execution of a EAW). It rather held that both terms could not be defined 
unilaterally, especially because they concern ‘autonomous concepts of Union law’.76 
Equally, in Wolzenburg the Court established that a Member State cannot make the 
ground for optional non-execution subject to an indefinite residence permit, especially 
since the ‘Citizenship’ Directive 2004/38 (Article 16(1)) does not impose such a 
requirement.77 One, however, cannot tolerate the fact that the lack of precise definition 
of the listed extraditable offences carries the potential of divergent implementation of 
the Framework Decision within the legal orders of the twenty-seven Member States. 
An example may clarify this argument. Although Greek law does not establish a clear 
distinction between possession of drugs for personal use and for trafficking, in the 
cases of Zanotti and d'Orsi the Greek courts issued a EAW against two Italian youths 
caught in possession of a small quantity of cannabis (21 grams) under the charge of 
international trafficking, transportation, and possession-for-sale of drugs. Italy, in this 
case, complied with the EAW, and because Greece does not have a law in place for 
trials in absentia, the two offenders had to suffer imprisonment until judgment was 
passed at first instance and before their release on bail.78  
The absence of pan-European definitions in relation to extraditable offences 
obliges, in principle, Member States to extradite individuals on suspicion of 
committing an offence that might not be a crime in most Member States. The 
Framework Decision’s sloppy drafting is particularly relevant in the spectre of 
‘thought’ or ‘opinion’ crimes, such as racism and xenophobia, which, although they 
are designated in Article 2 of the Framework Decision, are nonetheless treated 
differently by Member States. For instance, in the so-called Elsinore case, Denmark 
honored Germany’s extradition order against Stefan Günther and Flemming 
Christiansen, a German and a Danish citizen respectively. The crimes of which they 
were being charged (distribution of Nazi music to the German market), although 
relentlessly prosecuted in Germany are dealt with in Denmark, depending on 
evidence, by a warning, a pecuniary fine, or a short suspended prison sentence.79 This, 
however, did not stop the Danish authorities from complying with the issued EAW. 
Sweden, on the other hand, where the capacity to enforce such laws is rather weak, 
did not comply with Germany’s request to extradite a Danish citizen, who had been 
accomplice to the selling Nazi music to Germany.80  
Another noteworthy example exposing the disparities in the definition of what 
constitutes a ‘thought crime’ in the Member States is the case of Fredrick Töben.81 
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Töben, an Australian academic and holocaust denier, who was arrested and remanded 
in custody in the UK after a German bid to have him extradited for posting anti-
Semitic and revisionist information on his privately-funded Adelaide Institute internet 
website. Had he been extradited to Germany by the British authorities he would have 
been convicted under Section 130 of the German criminal code of criminal contempt 
and could have served up to a five-year custodial sentence as a political conscience 
prisoner. The Westminster Magistrates’ Court, however, discharged the extradition 
process by declaring the particulars of the warrant vague and imprecise and therefore 
the EAW to be invalid. The above examples only serve as illustrations of the 
profound tribulations experienced due to the abolition of the ‘double criminality’ test 
and the lack of definitions of the listed offences in Article 2 (2) of the Framework 
Decision. These deficiencies expose immense dangers to the desired process of 
swifter extradition all in the name of permissible freedom of speech and academic 
freedom within the EU. 
Through the adoption of corresponding framework decisions, the Council has 
implicitly filled in certain gaps left open by Article 2 (2) of the Framework Decision 
by either setting out common definitions of criminal (and extraditable) offences or by 
offering guidance as to the level of approximation of laws demanded of Member 
States. Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA,82 for instance, provides that the definition 
of offences relating to participation in a criminal organization should be approximated 
in the Member States. Article 1 of the Framework Decision provides that: 
criminal organisation’ means a structured association, established over 
a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with a view 
to committing offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty 
or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years, or a more 
serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit.  
Additionally, Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA83 provides Member States with 
detailed guidance as to the kind of intentional conduct that amounts to ‘racism’ and 
‘xenophobia’ and should therefore be punishable under national criminal law. This, 
contrary to an executing state’s own evaluation as to whether the conditions 
sufficiently comply with an extradition request, as per Elsinore or Töben, creates the 
basis for an almost automatic compliance with an issuing state’s demands to persecute 
individuals even on the basis of academic or artistic expressions of historical 
revisionism.84 Equally, Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA provides a list of new 
offences linked to terrorist activities. These are, according to Article 1 of the 
Framework Decision: public provocation to commit a terrorist offence; recruitment 
for terrorism; and training for terrorism.  
In line with the spirit of the Court’s decision in Advocaten voor de Wereld, 
harmonisation is not a pre-condition to the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition. Mutual recognition is, however, easier said than done. The EU 
Institutions seem to have acknowledged this through the increasing adoption of 
framework decisions. It can be argued that, notwithstanding the importance of mutual 
recognition as a central principle in European criminal law, its utilization without, 
where necessary, the aid of approximation counteracts efforts to overcome obstacles 
for efficient judicial cooperation. Such obstacles are created by the divergence of 
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legal approaches in the Member States. As this last sentiment illustrates, the objective 
of combating crimes, which pay no regard to national territorial boundaries, appears 
to legitimize further EU intervention. This approach fails to acknowledge, however, 
national choice and penal cultures. It also takes too lightly the fact that the 
Europeanisation of criminal law creates the potential for diminishing the traditional 
limits of sovereignty between Member States. 
As the above examples illustrate, some Member States find it ludicrous extradite 
suspects who have not, in their own eyes, engaged in criminal behaviour. Yet, in view 
of the ever-growing cross-border mobility of EU citizens, the lowering of internal 
borders, and the rapid development of electronic communication, compulsory 
prosecution constitutes for other Member States a way of combating cross-border 
crime. However, this hides a danger. There could be the emergence of instances 
where the exercise of state power over the citizen goes beyond the threshold set by the 
Framework Decision. For instance, issuing authorities often fail to apply a 
‘proportionality’ test during the issuing stage of the EAW. But, respondent authorities 
do not have a discretion to deny surrendering a person on the grounds of the triviality 
of the alleged offence, if it carries minimum custodial sentences.85 Poland has already 
issued EAWs for offences, which although falling within the scope of Article 2 of the 
Framework Decision, are nevertheless not serious enough to justify the measures, 
which the execution of a EAW requires.86  
In Zak v. Regional Court of Bydgoszcz, Poland87 the offence for which extradition 
was sought, though described in the EAW as ‘unintentional receiving of stolen 
property’, was only a mobile telephone. Although the High Court of England and 
Wales cast doubts on whether the conduct described in the warrant included the 
elements of belief or suspicion as to the mobile telephone being stolen, and was also 
sceptical as to whether it amounted to an extradition offence or an offence under 
English law (it did not hesitate to refer to the alleged offence as a trivial one) it upheld 
the order for extradition. One might argue that the implementation by all Member 
States of the recent Framework Decision applying the principle of mutual recognition 
to financial penalties88 might now reduce the volume of such cases. Yet, according to 
Article 5, the Framework Decision operates without any need for double criminality. 
What may appear to be a minor offence in the executing state may not be in the 
requesting state.  
The possibility under EU law for a citizen to be extradited to another Member 
State for an act committed and considered lawful in his/her own Member State, 
confirms that national criminal law is being stripped of its practical effect of 
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safeguarding the well-being of the nation state against threats from overseas. 
Similarly, it is not feasible for a citizen of one Member State to be aware that her/his 
actions performed in good faith in another Member State might be punishable. This 
may raise concerns not only among the most Euro-sceptic, alleging that law-abiding 
citizens may soon end up with a criminal record for non-compliance with laws that 
defy common sense, especially as ignorance of the law is no defence. 
 
1.3.2 Mutual Recognition and Mutual Trust: The Case of Fundamental Rights 
 
As previous arguments suggest, it is apparent that the idealism encompassed in the 
implementation of the principle of mutual recognition is not blatantly obvious in the 
sensitive area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This is perhaps 
the underlining reason behind the hesitance of the European Council at Tampere to 
condition the implementation to mutual recognition. Despite the notable progress at 
EU level in relation to judicial cooperation, exchange of information and 
monitoring,89 intergovernmental legislative mechanisms are still, to a certain extent, 
remote from the supranational level, even on basic issues such as access to justice. 
Because a person’s rights in respect of a criminal charge, trial, and sentence are 
strictly confined within the national boundaries of Member States the mutual 
recognition threshold will have to depend on a high level of trust between judicial 
authorities. There will also have to be procedural rules which respond to equivalent 
guarantees in relation to an individual’s liberty. 
Fair Trials International,90 reporting on certain individual cases, has highlighted the 
diverse practices in the application of justice across the European Union.91 In the 
context of the EAW, there is no common agenda for legal rights to be activated once 
the procedure under the Framework Decision has been triggered. It appears that 
mutual judicial cooperation in criminal matters cannot operate alone without efficient 
cross-border criminal cooperation measures. For instance, as regards legal aid, there is 
no mechanism under which defence lawyers in either country can coordinate or 
jointly evaluate the evidence available throughout judicial proceedings. Furthermore, 
the right to legal representation varies among Member States. Individuals will reach a 
point where they need to cover the costs of legal advice and translation services and 
deal with delays during their transfer from the responding state to the requesting 
state.92  
What is more, the adoption and implementation of minimum standards of 
procedural rights across the Member States never formed a precondition to the 
                                                 
89
 Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Joint Investigation Teams 2002/465/JHA OJ L 
162; Council Framework Decision 2005/876/JHA of 21 November 2005 on the Exchange of 
Information Extracted from the Criminal Record OJ L 322; Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters OJ L 350/60; Council Framework Decision 
2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European Evidence Warrant for the purpose of obtaining 
objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters OJ L 350/72; Commission 
Green Paper on obtaining evidence in criminal matters from one Member State to another and securing 
its admissibility, 11.11.2009, COM (2009) 624 Final. 
90
 Fair Trials International is an NGO working to ensure that citizens accused of a crime in a state other 
than their native receive a fair trial according to international standards of justice. 
91
 See more recent cases: Andrew Symeou, February 2009; Klaas Jan Bolt, April 2008; Luke Atkinson 
and Michael Binnington, February 2008. Available at www.fairtrials.net, Cases, Spotlight Archive. See 
also Fair Trials International, Annual Review 2006-07; Fair Trials International, Submission on the 
Future EU Justice Programme for 2010-1014, December 2008, also Available at www.fairtrials.net. 
92
 See for reference Kakis v. Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 772 HL.  
PROOF VERSION 
 19 
adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW. According to the principle of 
mutual recognition, Member States shall meet the standards of human rights 
protection set out in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).93 This also 
constitutes a Treaty obligation under Article 6 TEU. A reference to ‘respect for 
fundamental rights’ is made in the Preamble (Paragraphs 12; 13) and Article 1(3) of 
the Framework Decision.94 However, the ‘in absentia’ rules of Articles 35 of the 
Framework Decision do not allow a person to request a new trial on grounds that s/he 
was inadequately represented at the initial trial.95 This contradicts the Court’s decision 
in Krombach v. Bamberski,96 where, in the light of the ECHR, the Court expressly 
recognized the general principle that everyone is entitled to fair legal process.97 The 
Court upheld the decision of a German court (refusing on public policy grounds 
recognition and enforcement of a French judgment) due to the fact that the German 
defendant was denied legal representation at his trial before the assize court, which 
had condemned him in absentia on a civil claim for damages. According to Article 6 
(3) ECHR, free legal assistance and access to court is guaranteed for the accused in 
criminal proceedings. This applies, according to the European Court of Human Rights 
(EctHR) in Croissant v. Germany98, to the entire proceedings, including the pre-trial 
proceedings, the trial stage, the appellate proceedings and the cassation proceedings. 
This is to ensure that rights are ‘practical’ and effective and not theoretical and 
illusory.’99  
In Advocaten voor de Wereld the Court submitted that the principles of equality 
and non-discrimination bind all Member States and that differential treatment can 
only be objectively justified given the seriousness of the listed offences. The Court 
failed to make a comparison between the system under the Framework Decision on 
the EAW and the old procedure based on the double criminality test with reference to 
differential treatment. Hence, it is still unclear whether the application of the right to a 
fair trial; the right to legal aid and the route of appeal (or judicial review) in cases of 
breaches of safeguards in the issuing Member State can be secured in the absence of a 
European habeas corpus. The Framework Decision does not oblige Member States to 
refuse surrender on grounds of valid concerns about violations of the EU dual source 
of human rights streaming from the ECHR and the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States.100  In any case, the application of the principle of mutual recognition 
diminishes a national judge’s discretion to refuse extradition of a suspect who, for 
instance, has been convicted in absentia, even in cases where the judge is concerned 
                                                 
93
 Available at www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html. 
94
 Preamble (12): This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes the principles 
recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (7), in particular Chapter VI thereof. 
Preamble (13): No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious 
risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. 
Article 1(3): This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect 
fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union. 
95
 Raffaele Caldarelli v. The Court of Naples, Italy [2007] EWHC 1624. 
96
 Case C-7/98 Krombach v. Bamberski [2001] All ER (EC) 584. 
97
 Case C-185/95 Baustahlgewebe v. Commission [1998] ECR I-8417 (at para 20, 21); C174/98 & C-
189/98 Netherlands and Van der Wal v. Commission [2000] ECR I-0000 (at para 17).  
98
 Croissant v. Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 135. 
99
 Delcourt v. Belgium (1970) 1 EHRR 355. 
100
 Article 6(2) TEU. 
PROOF VERSION 
 20 
as to the violation of the suspect’s rights, for example the right to family life under 
Article 8 ECHR.101 All in all the merits of the extradition request are to be taken: 
…on trust and not investigated by the Member State from which 
extradition was sought…. Any inquiry by a member state into the merits 
of a proposed prosecution in another member state or into the 
soundness of a conviction in another member state becomes, therefore, 
inappropriate and unwarranted. It would be inconsistent with the 
principle of mutual respect and recognition of the judicial decisions in 
that member state. 102 
Alegre and Leaf comment that the assumption that Member States meet the ECHR 
standards ‘is open to discussion as, while it is true that all Member States and 
candidate countries have signed up to the ECHR, all have had and continue to have 
judgments against them in the Court of Human Rights.’103 Allegedly, this would have 
a negative impact upon imminent individual claims that an issuing state is violating 
fundamental rights, such as review to detention (Article 5 ECHR) and the right to fair 
trial (Article 6 ECHR; Art. 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights).104 
Yet, it would be naïve to assume that mutual trust is built solely on the fact that all 
Member States are signatories to the ECHR.105 As a result, the margin of appreciation 
in the application of rights safeguarded by the ECHR relating to the domestic 
administration of justice is difficult to sustain. Even prior to the implementation of the 
European Evidence Warrant106 the admissibility of evidence extracted through torture 
or ill-treatment (and the allegations of torture or ill-treatment by law enforcement 
officers) constituted major barriers to mutual trust between Member States and were, 
of course, infringements of Art 6 ECHR. 
In Ramda,107, ill-treatment and bodily harm was inflicted on the suspected offender 
by the French Police during an intense interrogation procedure. The French authorities 
denied an investigation of the complaints of ill-treatment contrary to the request of the 
British Court. Thus the Secretary of State refused to surrender the suspected offender 
because ‘it is unlawful for a public authority, such as the Secretary of State, to act in a 
way which is incompatible with a Convention (ECHR) right, and of course Article 
6(1) ECHR provides for the right to a fair trial. The test appears to be whether the 
evidence establishes a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice.’108 Similarly, in the 
French case of Irastorza Dorronsoro109 the admissibility of evidence allegedly 
extracted from an ETA suspect through torture or other ill-treatment was considered 
contrary to a state’s obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984).110  
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The outcome of both cases emphasizes the need to address the issue of the, often 
justified, lack of mutual trust in national procedural guarantees within the Union. It is 
worth mentioning that because the Framework Decision is binding only as to the end 
result, leaving the choice of form and method of implementation to Member States, 
the UK has inserted a human rights clause in its Extradition Act 2003. The executing 
judge thereby has the authority to deny the extradition of a person on grounds of 
incompatibility with the Human Rights Act 1998.111 Yet it should be mentioned that 
the ECHR allows signatory states to suspend / derogate from certain Convention 
obligations (Article 5) when they face a severe national emergency. After the terrorist 
attacks in the USA on September 11, 2002, the UK has used derogations as to the 
length of time alleged international terrorists may be detained (without charge) before 
being brought to trial on grounds of national security. Pre-trial detention is covered in 
the Commission’s Green Paper on Mutual Recognition of Non-Custodial Pre-Trial 
Supervision Measures 2004, which treats custody pending trial as ‘an exceptional 
measure’ and proposes ‘the introduction of a legal instrument enabling the Member 
States of the European Union to mutually recognise non-custodial pre-trial 
supervision measures’.112  
For the same purpose, the Commission issued a Communication to the Council and 
to the European Parliament on the ‘Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in 
Criminal Matters and the Strengthening of Mutual Trust between Member States’.113 
The Commission’s review of several aspects of the pre-trial stage (such as mutual 
recognition of evidence and pre-trial supervision measures) concludes that mutually 
recognised judgments along with further approximation of criminal law secure human 
rights such as the presumption of innocence, restrictions on decisions in absentia, and 
minimum standards on the gathering of evidence. Following the coming into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, it remains to be seen how the Court will apply the now binding 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as a means of managing national and international 
standards of fundamental rights protection. We cannot yet know whether the Court 
will be able to ensure that procedural safeguards for individuals are effectively 
controlled in a so-called ‘European penal area’. As the current position stands, it is 
only a matter of time before such cases will be referred to the European Court of 
Human Rights. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
 
Despite criticisms that European criminal law suffers from a lack of any uniform 
definition of a crime, as well as a lack of mutually accepted procedural requirements, 
it can be argued that the adoption of the Framework Decision on the EAW constitutes 
a step towards the creation of an effective area of freedom, security and justice. 
Indeed mutual recognition comforts those opposing harmonization in criminal 
matters. It is, according to Mitsilegas, ‘handy as it can provide results for judges and 
prosecutors when cooperating across borders…while prima facie Member States do 
not have to change their domestic criminal law to implement EU standards’.114 The 
problem, however, with mutual recognition as a prerequisite for the successful 
application of the Framework Decision on the EAW lies in the many variations in its 
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implementation. This diversity has led, in certain previously discussed cases, to a two-
tier system.115It can be submitted that the abolition of double criminality and the 
removal of bars to the surrender of one’s own nationals would have been met with 
applause had national criminal codes been subject to supranational harmonisation. As 
Geyer wryly observes: ‘if the principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters was 
regarded as an alternative to harmonisation of criminal law, why should member 
states still be allowed a legal instrument for the purpose?’116  
The Treaty of Lisbon has brought former Third Pillar provisions under a common 
general legal framework. Under Article 82 TFEU mutual recognition and 
approximation of laws form the basis for criminal judicial co-operation. Accordingly, 
Article 83 TFEU provides that measures in the area of police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters shall take the form of Regulations and Directives and therefore 
may confer directly effective rights upon individuals, justiciable before their national 
courts. It follows, therefore, that it is a matter of time that the Framework Decision on 
the EAW will be converted to a Directive. EU involvement in the area of criminal law 
will thus contribute to the furtherance of supranational actions and objectives while 
alleviating the past concerns about the lack of democratic legitimacy in the former 
Third Pillar.117 Yet, it would be foolhardy to assume that the Communitarization of 
the Third Pillar would lead to uniformity through evaporation of national vetoes and 
controls over criminal law. The adoption, implementation, and application of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW, or else the Europeanisation of extradition expose 
the intimate areas of sovereignty covered by the former Third Pillar. Indeed, the 
principle of mutual recognition has surmounted the danger of being challenged 
because of the alleged lack of genuine mutual confidence between Member States. 
Yet, there is lot more to be done.118 The choice between a robust European criminal 
justice policy and reconciliation of diverse national values calls for a prior 
reconciliation of national legislation and national constitutions. 
The argument against the legitimization of further European action in the field of 
criminal law entails the orthodox view that neither criminal law nor the rules of 
criminal procedure and police and judicial cooperation fall within the competence of 
the Union.119 This concerns, in particular, horizontal criminal law measures falling 
under Title V of the TFEU. This argument takes into account both the principle of 
subsidiarity and diversity in national penal systems. In his dissenting Opinion in Re 
Constitutionality of German Law Implementing the Framework Decision on a 
EAW,120 Judge Brob considered the violation of the principle of subsidiarity as the 
main factor for declaring the German EAW Act unconstitutional. Behind Judge 
Brob’s opinion lied the idea that the centralisation of competence at EU level would 
limit the ability of the Member States to guarantee constitutional rights currently 
enjoyed by their citizens. If, therefore, the Communitarisation of judicial cooperation 
throughout the EU is a step in the direction of a European Federal State, then any 
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concerns related to violations of subsidiarity are rational. An unprecedented 
harmonisation of national legislation may result in unconstitutional amendments of 
national constitutional provisions. Accordingly, there are limits to supranational 
criminal law insofar as EU law can only require national competent authorities to 
impose effective, dissuasive and proportionate criminal penalties against persons who 
have committed one of the prescribed offences referred to in the relevant provision. It 
does not determine the type and level of sanctions to be imposed. However, although 
the Union’s competence can go as far as condemning particular offences, the diversity 
of definitions regarding the same conduct in the Member States can cause problems. 
While encompassing many important points and issues, the abovementioned 
arguments can be said, at best, to provide only partial accounts of the future state of 
European criminal law. 
 
 
 
